Prior research has documented that the market responds to risk factor updates at the time of release, suggesting there is informational value to investors in these updates. In this study, we examine whether future returns are associated with risk factor updates. We find that firms with risk factor updates experience lower future returns, relative to firms without updates. Further, we find that firms that shy away from language indicating risk to firm fundamentals in a risk factor update have the strongest predictability in future returns. This result suggests that the content of the update is related to the completeness of the market reaction at the update's filing. This research is of direct interest to investors and regulators who are currently considering how to improve risk factor disclosure requirements.
Introduction
In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring risk factors to be disclosed in annual reports and updated in quarterly reports. Since then, investors have expressed concern that the information being presented may be too generic and lack insightful information (Johnson 2010; IRRC Institute 2016) . In addition, the SEC has continued to express interest in improving the disclosure requirement (Johnson 2010; Tysiac 2016) . Given the concern over the current information being provided, it's not surprising that some have suggested information in risk factors may be overlooked (KPMG 2011; Greenberg 2007; Greenberg 2008) . Despite the potential shortcomings of the disclosures, researchers have provided evidence confirming informational value in annual and quarterly risk factor disclosures (Campbell et al. 2014; Israelsen 2014; Filzen 2015; Dyer et al. 2016) , especially when the disclosure is more specific (Hope et al. 2016) . Therefore, in this paper, our focus is on whether the market fully incorporates the information in the risk factor update at the time of disclosure. Specifically, we examine returns subsequent to quarterly risk factor updates to better understand whether investors react appropriately to the information contained therein.
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that information that leads to uncertainty as to the future payoff structure of the firm generates market underreaction (Francis et al. 2007; You and Zhang 2009) . Further, the underreaction induced by information uncertainty does not require an assumption of investor irrationality as its underlying cause (Brav and Heaton 2002) . 1 In this setting, the information being presented in risk factor disclosures creates additional uncertainty about future cash flows to the firm. Specifically, under current regulation, firms are required to 1 Our tests cannot rule out the possibility of other explanations playing a role in incomplete reactions to risk factor disclosures, and doing so is beyond the scope of this study.
disclose possible material events that could adversely affect the firm (Robbins and Rothenberg 2006; Filzen 2015) . Due to the uncertainty inherent in the information being disclosed and consistent with prior theory, we predict that investors will not fully incorporate the information content of risk factor disclosures at the time of release.
We are interested in the market reaction to risk factor information that is previously undisclosed. Because the underlying disclosure requirements differ between annual and quarterly filings, quarterly filings are our focus. For annual reports, firms are required to disclose all risks currently facing the firm, regardless of when the firm first became exposed to that risk. However, in quarterly filings, firms are only required to "update" the risk factors section with new information, if necessary. Thus, we focus on the reaction to quarterly updates to risk factors to ensure that we are examining the market reaction to new information.
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Following the methodology outlined in Filzen (2015) , we utilize the Go Programming
Language to process 10-Q filings to determine whether a given firm-quarter contains an update.
Using this process on an updated sample period, we are able to replicate the findings in Filzen (2015) that there is a negative market reaction for firms with risk factor updates around the filing of the 10-Q. Controlling for this reaction, post-earnings announcement drift, and other factors, we document a negative association between firms with risk factor updates and returns in the three months following the 10-Q filing. We then create a risk factor update trading strategy that is long in firms without a risk factor update, and short in firms with a risk factor update. This strategy yields positive annualized alpha's of 3.53%. Overall, this evidence suggests there is significant information in risk factor updates that is not being impounded into prices at the time of the 10-Q filing.
The strategy discussed so far is based purely on the presence of a risk factor update, and doesn't incorporate the content of the disclosure. Filzen (2015) finds that the market response to risk factor updates at the time of the filing is stronger for updates that use more language related to firm fundamentals. Specifically, Filzen (2015) utilizes the word list generated in Balakrishnan and Bartov (2011) to capture the risks to firm fundamentals in risk factor disclosures, and categorizes firms as "strong" updaters if they fall in the top quartile of the key word count, which attempts to capture the focus of the disclosure. 3 In our setting, it isn't clear ex ante how partitioning the sample based on key word counts will affect the predictability of future returns.
On the one hand, a more negative market reaction for "strong" updaters at the time of the 10-Q filing might indicate a more complete market reaction at the time of filing, with less predictability of future returns. On the other hand, "weak" updates that generate a smaller market reaction at the time of the 10-Q filing may truly be less meaningful updates and therefore may not be associated with future returns. Our findings support the former explanation. We find that our results are strongest for firms that contain less language related to firm fundamentals (i.e., "weak" updaters). The alpha's from a trading strategy that is long in firms without a risk factor update, and short in firms with a weak risk factor update are 5.28%, considerably higher than before. This result suggests that the efficiency of the market reaction to a risk factor update is related to the language used in the disclosure. From a policy perspective, regulators may be able to better understand the types of disclosures that generate more complete market reactions in their efforts to improve the usefulness of risk factor disclosure.
Our study contributes to the literature on incomplete reactions to accounting information (e.g., Sloan 1996; You and Zhang 2009; Li 2011; among others) . The results show that a trading strategy based on risk factor updates can generate positive abnormal returns post-disclosure.
Further, we find that this trading strategy is most effective when including only firms with a risk factor update, but that fail to use words that convey the risk is related to firm fundamentals.
These findings are of direct interest to regulators who are currently interested in improving risk factor disclosures (SEC 2016; Brav and Heaton 2002) . Predictability in post-disclosure returns suggests that the market is not fully reacting to the information contained in risk factor updates at the time of disclosure. To the extent this is due to information uncertainty, improved mandatory disclosure requirements could help mitigate this inefficiency. Our study finds that one potential solution to this may be to study (and ultimately encourage emulation of) firms that generate a stronger (and more complete) market response at the time of the filing.
In the next section we provide background information and motivate our study. In section three we discuss our research design and sample selection, followed by a discussion of our empirical results in section four. Finally, in section five we conclude.
Literature review and hypothesis development

Risk factor disclosure
Historically, the disclosure of risk factors has been required of managers during the IPO process.
The SEC extended this requirement to annual reports for fiscal years ending after December 1, 2005 (SEC 2005 , with smaller reporting companies excluded from the requirements. The rule requires firms to disclose material factors that may adversely affect the issuers business, operations, industry or financial position, or its future firm performance under "Item 1A" in the 10-K (Robbins and Rothenberg 2006; Filzen 2015) . 4 The requirement for quarterly reports is different in its scope. Disclosures in quarterly reports are reserved for updates to risk factors only, assuming that the risk factors facing the firm have changed. The requirement to update risk factors in quarterly reports began for all firms in the first quarter after its initial annual disclosure was made, which corresponds to quarters ending during fiscal years subsequent to December 1,
2006.
Market participants, as well as the SEC, have been critical of the disclosures that have been made to date. Johnson (2010) reports that the disclosures may be too broad and generic and, as a result, that the SEC was interested in reviewing the disclosure requirement for possible revision.
Additionally, the SEC has been putting pressure on firms to produce better disclosures by issuing comment letters (Johnson 2010; Beatty et al. 2015) . Academic research has also been interested in the informational value of risk factor disclosures, especially in light of concerns from market participants about the disclosures. In the context of annual disclosures, many studies have concluded that there is informational value in the disclosures. Campbell et al. (2014) find that there is predictable variation in the amount of disclosure based on factors that affect firm risk, and that the disclosures are correlated with future measures of risk. Israelsen (2014) also finds that information in risk factor disclosures is correlated with traditional asset pricing risk factors, suggesting the information being disclosed is informative about risk in general. In addition, studies have found that the market reacts negatively to longer risk factor disclosures around the 10-K filing date (Campbell et al. 2014; Dyer et al. 2016) , and that more specific annual disclosures generate stronger reactions (Hope et al. 2016) . Studying annual risk disclosure across the entire 10-K, mostly before the requirement of a separate risk factor disclosure section, Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that investors risk perceptions are affected by changes in annual amounts of risk disclosures. Overall, these studies suggest that there is informational value in annual risk factor disclosures and that investors react to this information at the time of filing.
Other studies have looked beyond the informational value of annual risk factor disclosures. Dyer et al. (2016) and Beatty et al. (2015) find that annual risk factor disclosures are increasing over time. Beatty et al. (2015) find that this increase in length may be decreasing informativeness of risk factors over time, specifically in the context of disclosures about financial constraints. Bailey and Filzen (2016) find that the expertise of those charged with risk management in a firm is positively associated with the level of risk factor disclosure, and that the market doesn't react as strongly to longer disclosures when there is a more experienced Chief Risk Officer.
Additional studies have begun to focus on how to extract qualitative information (beyond total word counts and word counts from dictionary lists) from risk factor disclosures (Bao and Datta 2014; Huang and Li 2011) .
Examining quarterly risk factor disclosures, Filzen (2015) finds that quarterly updates to risk factor disclosures are associated with negative market reactions at the time of the 10-Q filing, and that these updates are able to predict future negative earnings shocks. These findings suggest that there is also informational value that investors respond to in quarterly risk factor updates.
Overall, academic research studying risk factor disclosures concludes that the market responds to information in risk factor disclosures at the time of disclosure. What has yet to be studied is whether the market fully incorporates the information being disclosed, which is the focus of our research.
Hypotheses
Investors use risk factor disclosures to infer future changes in the business and financial risks faced by the disclosing firm. But, uncertainties regarding the probability distribution pertinent to the updated risk factor, or pertinent to its effects, makes accurate assessments difficult and can contribute to market underreaction (Francis et al. 2007; You and Zhang 2009) . Overall, the complexity of the risk factor section creates uncertainty regarding the future cash flows to the firm. Interestingly, the underreaction exhibited following an information event need not rely on market inefficiency as it source. Brav and Heaton (2002) develop a model wherein underreaction is a rational structural response to uncertain or incomplete information. This results arises due to the potential for mistakes in estimating future cash flows or risk premiums that result from a rational application of uncertain or incomplete information.
Quarterly updates to risk factor disclosures present new information about events that are uncertain in likelihood and in magnitude of impact if realized. This creates difficulty in predicting the future state of the firm, especially since amounts and assessments of probabilities are not required to be disclosed (other than the disclosure threshold of "material"). This results in uncertainty as to the future payoff structure of the firm. Empirical evidence supports the idea of market underreaction when information creates uncertainty. Francis et al. (2007) find that lower earnings quality (i.e., more uncertainty about future earnings) is associated with more delay in the reaction to earnings announcements. Similarly, You and Zhang (2009) find that 10-Ks with higher levels of complexity are associated with more delayed market reactions. Based on these findings, we hypothesize (stated in alternative form):
H1: Risk factor updates will be negatively associated with future stock market returns.
Further, the content of risk factor disclosure may affect the predictability of future returns.
However, broadly speaking, utilizing the content of the disclosure could enhance or deteriorate the analysis. On the one hand, longer disclosures and/or key work counts may indicate a more likely, more imminent, or more material risk factor update. On the other hand, managerial discretion in writing style and repetition of previously disclosed information may not be relevant.
In addition, the number of updates being disclosed may confound this relationship. For example, a firm with one very meaningful update to a single risk factor may be more important than multiple risk factors being updated in a very minor way.
Prior research has incorporated content in the context of concentrating on how much of the disclosure focuses on firm fundamentals (Balakrishnan and Bartov 2011) . Because risk factor disclosures contain information about potential adverse outcomes, the intuition is that more of a focus on firm fundamentals would suggest that firm fundamentals are more likely to be affected by the risk. Filzen (2015) applied this concept to quarterly risk factor updates by separating updates into two categories based on the level of these key words that focus on firm fundamentals. He found that strong updaters (firms with a risk factor update that were in the top quartile of key fundamentals word counts) drove the negative market reactions at the time of filing, suggesting these updates were more important to the market.
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In our context, it isn't necessarily clear how verbiage related to firm fundamentals should impact the predictability of future returns. Because strong updaters have a stronger initial market reaction, those updates may be the most meaningful updates. Under this view, weak updaters may be effectively meaningless updates and may be creating noise in the analysis. In other words, both the initial reaction as well as predictability of future returns may be driven by the most important risk factor updates: the strong updaters.
An alternative view would be that both strong and weak updates are important, on average, but that the market reaction is more incomplete for one group. Consistent with this view, Filzen (2015) found that firms with weak updates were capable of predicting future negative earnings shocks, suggesting the weak updaters may be important as well. Under this view, and as a result of the prior findings related to the initial market reaction, the market reaction to weak updaters (i.e., firms who don't use as many words relating to firm fundamentals) may be incomplete. In other words, the market reaction is more negative at the time of filing for strong updaters because the reaction is more complete, rather than that the disclosure is necessarily more important. Based on the limited evidence discussed above, our second hypothesis is as follows (stated in alternative form):
H2:
The negative association between risk factor updates and future stock market returns will be strongest for firms that use less language related to firm fundamentals.
Research Design and Sample Selection
We identify our sample of 10-Q filings from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and (2015), we restrict our initial sample to firms with a market capitalization of at least $100 million to exclude "Smaller Reporting
Companies" and to avoid the problems documented by Nondorf et al. (2012) . 6 Additionally, we require: 1) that the 10-Q filing be in HTML format; 7 2) that Compustat contain data on relevant control variables for filing firms; 3) the filer be tracked by CRSP's daily stock return database;
and, 4) that sufficient data be available, post-filing, to compute post-filing abnormal returns. The result of our sample identification and restrictions yields a sample of 64,711 filings. Additional requirements pertinent to the identification of risk updates (discussed in more detail below)
further restrict the sample to 52,955 filings by 4,353 unique firms. Table 1 provides a detailed account of the sample selection process.
[Insert Table 1 here]
For each filing we extract the disclosure's Item 1A using the Go Programming Language.
The methodology for identifying filings containing a risk factor update follows Filzen (2015) wherein a firm is assumed to have an update if three conditions are satisfied: 1) the filing must contain a risk factor section; 2) the section must contain at least 200 words; and, 3) for the second and third quarters of the fiscal year, the section must be at least 100 words longer than the previously disclosed risk factor section. The logic underpinning the first of these conditions is self-explanatory. By definition, a filing cannot be determined to include a risk factor update if it did not also contain a corresponding risk factor section. The second condition is necessary as many firms include a risk factor section, but simply use the section to restate the disclosure requirement and state that there have been no material updates. The third condition accounts for the fact that the SEC requires that once a firm discloses an update that the same update remain in the Item 1A section until the firm's next 10-K filing. If all three conditions are met, then our primary variable of interest, Updateit, an indicator variable, takes a value of 1.
Filings which fail to meet the criteria to be classified as a firm-quarter containing an update are not unilaterally classified as not containing an update, i.e., Updateit=0. Again following Filzen (2015) , we classify firm-quarters as not having an update if the filing: 1) does not contain a risk factor section; or, 2) contains a risk factor section with less than 100 words. If these conditions are met, then the firm is said to not have a risk update (i.e., Updateit=0) in that quarter. We exclude firm-quarters with risk factor section word counts between 100 and 200 words to avoid ambiguity of whether there has been an update. 8 The identification of filings containing (and not containing) an update limit the sample to the 52,955 filings used in our analysis.
To evaluate the post-announcement returns of 10-Q filers, we compute the filer's three month buy-and-hold abnormal return, i.e., BHAR3moit. More specifically, for each firm we calculate the continuously compounded buy-and-hold return over the three months following the filing date and subtract the value-weighted, three month buy-and-hold return of a corresponding size and book-to-market matched portfolio over the same period. 9 We utilize three month returns because the results in Filzen (2015) suggest the risk factors being disclosed are relatively imminent on average, and so that we do not contaminate the returns period when an additional quarterly report is filed. Filing firms are matched to their corresponding size and book-to-market portfolios based on their quintile ranking from the fiscal year end preceding the filing date. Following You and
Zhang (2009), we use buy-and-hold abnormal returns to measure abnormal returns subsequent to 10-Q filings as they reflect the compounding in returns and facilitate cross-sectional analysis of the variation in abnormal returns.
10 [Insert Table 2 Panel C displays the heterogeneity in BHAR3mo by industry over the sample period. The mean BHAR3mo ranges from -2.98% for mining firms to 1.38% for firms in the fabrication industry. [Insert Table 3 here]
Investor Underreaction to Risk Factor Updates
We split the sample of 52,955 firm-quarters into subsamples by Update and analyze the differences in means (medians) over our entire sample. Table 4 presents the results of this testing. The mean and median BHAR3mo for filings with a risk update (i.e., Update=1) is less than that for filings without an update by 0.75% at the mean and 1.11% at the median. When annualized, this equates to a 3.03% or a 4.47% decline in equity values for risk updating filers relative to their non-updating peers during the three months following the 10-Q filing.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The abnormal announcement return (CAR[-1,1]) to risk updating filers exhibits a similar result.
10-Q filings containing a risk factor update have statistically-significant, lower announcement abnormal returns relative to filings without a risk update. Filers with a risk factor update also tend to have marginally higher exposure to systematic risk and lower returns in the six-months preceding the filing, consistent with the findings in Campbell et al. (2014) . Additionally, updating filers tend to be smaller, have more growth opportunities, and have shorter 10-Q's overall (excluding the risk factor section).
Controlling for Confounding Risk Factors
The results of Table 4 Table 5 .
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results in the left column of Table 5 include, as the only covariate in addition to the fixed effects, Update. Controlling only for year and industry effects, firm-quarters containing an update are associated with an abnormal return of -0.85% in the time period subsequent to the filing. The second and third columns of Table 5 add the announcement abnormal return (i.e.,
CAR [-1,1] ) and Beta and Momentum as covariates, respectively. In both specifications, firmquarters containing a risk factor update are associated with lower abnormal return following the filing relative to firm-quarters without an update. Column (4) of Table 5 presents the results from our fully specified model. Controlling for the variation in the financial characteristics between the two subsamples, i.e., firm-quarters with and without an update, filings containing a risk factor update are associated with negative abnormal returns subsequent to the disclosure.
Using the buy-and-hold method to calculate abnormal returns may exaggerate short-term abnormal returns due to compounding (Mitchell and Stafford 2000) . We address this issue using a calendar time analysis. Specifically, for each month we compute the value-weighted returns to two portfolios based on whether or not a firm had a risk factor update in the preceding three months. If a firm has not had a risk factor update in the preceding three months, it enters into our long portfolio. If a firm has had a risk factor update in the preceding three months, it enters into our short portfolio. The returns to the hedged portfolio, then, are the difference between the long and short portfolios. We examine the intercepts to the portfolios using three asset-pricing models: the market model, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The results of these tests are reported in Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
The monthly intercepts to the hedged portfolios (i.e., Long-Short) remain relatively constant regardless of the asset-pricing model used, ranging from 0.28% to 0.29%. The hedged, noinvestment portfolio generates 3.53%% when compounded on an annualized basis. In all specifications, the intercepts to the Long portfolio, the portfolio containing firms without a risk factor update in the preceding three month, are indistinguishable from zero. The positive intercepts present in the hedged portfolios are driven by the negative intercepts to the short portfolios, the portfolio containing firms with a risk factor update in the preceding three months.
The monthly intercepts for the short portfolios range from -0.23% to -0.29%.
The Content of Risk Factor Updates and Future Returns
The evidence above suggests that markets underreact to risk factor updates at the date of the filing, on average. Implementing a no-investment trading strategy long in firms without a risk factor update and short in firms with a risk factor update yields a positive and significant alpha.
This result stems from the simple presence of an update while remaining naïve to the update's content. The questions becomes, then, to what extent does the content of the update affect our findings? Filzen (2015) finds that the market reaction to "strong" updates (updates using more language that relates to the risk to firm fundamentals) is larger at the time of filing. On the one hand, a more negative market reaction for "strong" updaters might indicate a more complete market reaction at the time of filing. On the other hand, "weak" updates may truly be less meaningful updates and therefore generate a smaller market response.
In this section, we explore the extent to which the content of the risk factor disclosure contributes to the observed drift subsequent to the risk update. Specifically, we examine the extent to which risk factor verbiage that is more descriptive of potential impacts to firm fundamentals affects the underreaction subsequent to the filing of the update. To evaluate the content of the disclosure, we construct a variable (Strong Update) which captures the content of the disclosure. Utilizing the list generated in Balakrishnan and Bartov (2011) and following
Filzen (2015), we categorize firms with a risk factor update as "strong" updaters (Strong Update=1) if they fall in the top quartile of the key word count. 11 We create a second indicator variable (Weak Update) which take a value of 1 if the firm-quarter contains an update and is in the bottom three quartiles of all filings containing an update. When counting words in the list, we used a snowball porter stemmer to capture inflections and variations of the root word.
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We repeat the regression analyses presented in Table 5 , now including our two measures of update type, i.e., Strong Update and Weak Update. The results are presented in Table 7 . Across all four regression specifications presented in Table 7 , coefficient estimates on Strong Update are near zero and are statistically insignificant. In contrast, estimates on Weak Update are all negative and statistically significant. Firm-quarters with "weak updates" are most predictive of post-filing abnormal returns. We test for coefficient equality in all four specifications using Ftests. With the exception of the base model, the null hypothesis of coefficient equality is rejected at better than the 10% level (5% in the fully specified model). The difference between Strong Update and Weak Update is economically meaningful as well. In the fully specified model, i.e., column (4), the difference between the estimate on Strong Update and Weak Update results in a compounded annualized return of 3.36%.
[Insert Table 7 here]
We repeat the calendar time analysis presented above using only those filings containing a "weak" risk update. For each month we compute the value-weighted returns to two portfolios based on whether or not a firm had a "weak" risk factor update in the preceding three months. If a firm had a "weak" risk factor update (Weak Update=1) in the preceding three months, it enters 11 The complete word list is as follows : bankrupt, business, cash, charge, competition, competitive, competitor, conditions, cost, customer, cyclical, demand, division, earnings, economy, environment, expense, financial, income, lawsuit, legal, liquidity, litigation, market, operations, product, profit, revenue, sales, seasonal, services, settlement, solvency, spending, and sue. 12 For example, expense becomes "expens."
into our short portfolio. If a firm has not had a risk factor update (Update=0) in the preceding three months, it enters into our long portfolio. The return to the hedged portfolio is computed as the difference between the long and short portfolios. We examine the intercepts to the portfolios using three asset-pricing models: the market model, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The results of these tests are reported in Table   8 .
[Insert Table 8 here]
The monthly intercept to the hedged portfolio (i.e., Long-Short) is between 0.43% and 0.44% for all asset pricing models and is statistically significant at better than the 5% level. Going long in firms without a risk factor update and shorting firms with a "weak" risk factor update generates a positive alpha for the no-investment portfolio. In economic terms, this strategy yields 5.28% when compounded on an annualized basis. This result is largely driven by the "weak" update filers. The intercepts to the portfolios containing "weak" update filers are negative and statistically significant over the sample period. Overall, these results suggest that risk factor updates employing language less related to firm fundamentals contributes to investor underreaction at the announcement of the risk update.
Conclusion
We examine whether the market reaction to quarterly risk factor updates is complete at the time of the 10-Q filing. We find quarterly risk factor updates are negatively associated with future returns. Further, we explore how the content of the disclosure interacts with this relationship.
Specifically, we use the classification structure in Filzen (2015) to classify risk factor updates as either strong or weak risk factor updates based on the amount of words used in the disclosure that focus on firm fundamentals. Our results suggest that weak updates (i.e. risk factor updates that shy away from using words related to firm fundamentals) are strongly negatively associated with future returns. In other words, there appears to be a more complete reaction to the information contained in an average risk factor update when the update better describes the risk's potential effects on firm fundamentals. These results are important for investors and regulators who are interested in improving the disclosure requirement. Our results indicate not only that risk factors are negatively associated with future returns, but also that the content of the disclosure affects this relationship. This suggests that regulators may be able to encourage better disclosure by examining characteristics of disclosures the market finds most useful.
There are some limitations to our research and opportunities for future research. First, our analysis uses a computer algorithm to help classify observations. There are many advantages to this methodology, including the ability to process many filings relatively quickly. However, as with all studies that use computer assisted data collection techniques, there is bound to be some error in the process -which we expect to be random in nature. Second, we find strong evidence that content is associated with the return predictability documented in this study. We believe there is a great deal of opportunity for future research (both using computer assisted techniques as well as manual classification) to improve our understanding of the impact that content has on this relationship. 
